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AFTER "VOLUNTARY" LIABILITY: THE EPA'S 
IMPLEMENTATION OF SUPERFUND 
Carol L. Dorge* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Although the 1970s were known as the environmental decade, 
one of the most significant environmental statutes was not 
adopted until 1980. That statute, the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA),l commonly known as Superfund,2 like the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)3 before it, was designed 
to fill a void in existing federal environmental regulation.4 
CERCLA's principal focus is on landfill sites which have served 
in the past for the disposal of hazardous waste.5 Section 104 of the 
Act authorizes government cleanup of hazardous sites. This au-
thority is supplemented by "abatement authority" in section 106, 
which allows the government to take emergency action to clean 
up or control a threatening hazardous waste site. Section 106 
allows the EPA to bring an injunctive action against a potentially 
liable party where an imminent and substantial endangerment is 
threatened. Section 107 creates a scheme of liability permitting 
recovery of the government's cost of controlling contaminants 
which may be released from these inactive sites and from existing 
* Martin, Craig, Chester & Sonnenschein, Chicago, Illinois; B.S. 1975, Cornell Univer-
sity; M.S. 1977, Illinois Institute of Technology; J.D. 1981, Notre Dame University. The 
author acknowledges the substantial assistance provided by Jeffrey C. Fort in the 
formulation and development of the views presented in this article. 
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. V 1981). 
2. See, e.g., 126 CONGo REC. H9165 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (statement of Rep. Biagi). 
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6986 (Supp. V. 1981). 
4. See, e.g., 126 CONGo REC. H9156 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (statement of Rep. Stag-
gers). 
5. See, e.g., 126 CONGo REC. H9154-55 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (statement of Rep. 
Florio). 
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manufacturing facilities. This section establishes rules of liability 
for site owners as well as various customers of the disposal sites, 
such as manufacturers who generate waste by-products.6 Strict 
liability, defined as the standard of liability under section 311 of 
the Clean Water Act, is imposed.7 Cleanup costs will exceed ten 
million dollars at many sites.s The fund has accumulated over 650 
million dollars, much more money than has been spent.9 
Despite the significant scope of the statute, it is the result of 
Congressional compromise, and represents a retreat from earlier 
versions of the bill which proposed more expansive and less de-
fined liability schemes.1O Congressional compromise resulted in 
statutory confusion, and courts are now in the process of attempt-
ing to determine Congress' intent with regard to many CERCLA 
provisions. 
Even taking into account this statutory confusion, implementa-
tion of CERCLA has floundered under the Reagan Administra-
tion. Despite the substantial support which the Act received from 
the Senate Republican leadership,H the Administration's im-
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. v 1981). Specifically, in addition to owners and operators, 
persons who dispose of waste at a site (generators) and persons who transport waste to a 
site are among those who may be held liable. 42 U.S.C. § 9607a-1-9607a-4 (Supp. v 1981). A 
liable party may be held responsible for damage to natural resources as well as cleanup 
costs. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(c) (Supp. v 1981). Regulations for assessing those damages are 
to be promulgated. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c) (Supp. V 1981). A notice of proposed rulemaking has 
been published at 48 Fed. Reg. 1084 (1983), and 48 Fed. Reg. 34,768 (1983) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. ch. 11). 
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (Supp. V 1981); 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (Supp. V 1981). 
8. The EPA has estimated that surface cleanup costs will be approximately $4.5 to $6 
million per site, and an additional $4 to $5 million for groundwater cleanup. 14 ENy'T 
REP. (BNA) 1245 (Nov. 4, 1983). Earlier estimates set the average cost at only $6.5 
million. Id.; 48 Fed. Reg. 40,677 (1983). 
9. The fund is structured as a "1.6 billion dollar fund," supported by Congressional 
appropriations through 1985. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 9653 (Supp. V 1981). The EPA announced in 
September, 1983, that the fund had accumulated $668.5 million as of July 1, 1983. Of that 
amount, $184.4 million had been paid out. 14 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 803 (Sept. 9, 1983). A later 
announcement suggests that a significant proportion of the money which has been spent 
($47 million "obligated" as of Sept. 30, 1983) has been uscd in "emergency" cleanup 
actions. Chi. Trib., Nov. 15, 1983, § 1, at 8, col. 1. The EPA estimates that as much as $16 
billion may be required to cleanup remaining sites-ten times more than the present 
authorization. 14 ENy'T REP. (BNA) 725 (Feb. 3, 1984). 
10. The enacted bill resulted from three years of Congressional hearings, debates, and 
compromise on bills reported to the floor of each house of Congress. Most of the principal 
features of the act were debated and contested, including funding mechanisms, the need 
for federal legislation, and most significantly, the appropriate standard of liability. See 
infra text and notes at notes 50-60. 
11. E.g., 126 CONGo REC. 14,988 (1980). A bipartisan group of 78 Senators voted in favor 
of the bill. Only nine Senators opposed the measure. Id. 
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pIe mentation of the new program has indicated an unwillingness 
to put into effect the comprehensive scheme approved by Con-
gress. The Administration has clearly declared its intention to 
encourage "voluntary" private-party cleanup, using its emer-
gency response authority under section 106 of the Act, rather 
than clean up the site itself under its section 104 authority, and 
then seek cost recovery from responsible parties under section 
107. The strategy appears to be to coerce private parties to accept 
some degree of financial responsibility for cleanup, rather than 
defending themselves in a later cost recovery action under section 
107.12 "Potentially responsible parties" have been identified and 
offered the alternative of paying for the cleanup of a site, or 
litigating the question of liability.13 The threat of a judicial deter-
mination of liability is onerous because responsible parties are 
apparently jointly and severally liable,14 and some sites were 
cleaned up under these negotiated settlements.15 
Both Democratic and Republican leaders have harshly crit-
icized the Reagan Administration for its failure to spend the 
monies authorized by statute for the cleanup of hazardous sites,16 
and for its handling of the hazardous waste program in generalP 
12. 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 613-14 (Sept. 18, 1981). Even the National Contingency Plan 
embodies the "voluntary" cleanup concept as an alternative to remedial response action. 
47 Fed. Reg. 31,216 (July 16, 1983) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(c»; see infra text and 
notes at notes 125-26; see generally 47 Fed. Reg. 31,180-31,243 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
§ 300). 
13. See, e.g., Brown, EPA Pre-litigation Enforcement Strategy in Hazardous Waste 
Cases, 14 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 149-52 (May 27, 1983). 
14. A common scenario involves a site where generators have contributed different 
quantities of waste and waste with different hazard potential. The EPA has taken the 
position that parties are jointly and severally liable, and the issue has been the subject of 
heated dispute. The Southern District of Ohio recently sided with EPA in United States 
v. Chern-Dyne Corp., No. C-1-82-840, slip op. (S.D. Ohio, Oct. 11, 1983). The court held that, 
at least where the harm is indivisible, parties may be jointly and severally liable. Id. at 
16. This involves, however, a "fairly complex factual determination" of whether the 
harm is indivisible. 1 d. at 18. Discussing the legislative history of the liability pro-
vision, the 'Court reasoned that by removing a reference to joint and several liability 
from the bills' liability provision, Congress apparently intended that common law or 
statutory rules relating to joint and several liability continue to apply. I d. at 11; see 126 
CONGo REC. H11,787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement of Rep. Florio); id. at Hll,788 
(statements of G. Bursky, United States Dept. of Justice). 
15. For example, more than 200 generators participated in settlement agreements 
totaling more than $10 million for cleanup of the Seymour site in Indiana. 13 ENV'T REP. 
(BN A) 877 (Oct. 29, 1982); id. at 1412 (Dec. 17, 1982). A settlement agreement between 
Velsicol Chemical Company, the EPA, and the State of Michigan resulted in a cleanup 
fund of $38.5 million. ld. at 1165 (Nov. 26, 1982). 
16. See. e.o .. 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1742-43 (April 30, 1982). 
17. See, e.g., 13 ENV'T REP. (BN A) 921-923 (Nov. 5, 1982). 
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As its first order of business, the new Administration reduced the 
size of the EPA and restructured its enforcement and hazardous 
waste programs. Reorganization took precedence over regulatory 
action,18 and the EPA delayed until July 16, 1982, a major step 
required by CERCLA-amendment of the National Contingency 
Plan.19 The newly titled "National Oil and Hazardous Substances 
Contingency Plan" contains important guidance for both gov-
ernment and private action, setting standards for cleanup of 
inactive hazardous waste sites.20 It incorporates and expands 
upon the National Contingency Plan, which addresses the 
cleanup of certain discharges into navigable waters.21 Nor were 
guidelines issued for coordination between the state and federal 
governments for emergency situations, as required by section 
'106(c).22 Lacking these nationwide regulations, the program con-
tinued with fits and starts through the delayed appointment and 
early termination of the former Associate Administrator for 
18. See, e.g., id. at 788-89 (Oct. 23, 1981). The nomination of Anne Gorsuch as EPA 
Admmistrator was confirmed May 5, 1981. See id. at 59 (May 8, 1981). On June 12, she 
announced a major reorganization of the Agency, effective July 1. This action included 
abolishment of the Office of Enforcement, "policy" enforcement attorneys were assigned 
to the former Office of General Counsel (renamed Office of Legal and Enforcement 
Counsel), while other technical enforcement attorneys and technical staff were assigned 
to the various "program" offices, such as air, water and waste. Id. at 243 (June 19,1981). 
The EPA General Counsel and Associate General Counsel, Messrs. Percy and Sullivan, 
were also appointed. I d. at 244. 
On December 2, Administrator Gorsuch approved a second major reorganization 
which transferred all attorneys to the Office of Legal and Enforcement Counsel. rd. at 
974 (Dec. 11, 1981). 
On March 26, 1982, EPA General Counsel Perry was promoted to Associate Adminis-
trator for Legal and Enforcement Counsel. Mr. Sullivan, the Associate General Counsel 
who had supervised EPA's enforcement efforts, was stripped of his authority, id. at 1589 
(April 2, 1982). (Mr. Sullivan resigned shortly thereafter). 
19. See 42 U.S.C. 99,605 (Supp. v 1981). 
20. 47 Fed. Reg. 31,202-19 (1982) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300). 
21. See EDF v. Gorsuch, No. 81-2083, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 1982). 
22. See id. section 106(c) states: 
Within 180 days after enactment of this Act, the Administrator ... shall ... 
publish guidelines for using the imminent hazard, enforcement and emergency 
response authorities of this section and other existing statutes administered by 
the Administrator ... Such guidelines shall be to the extent practicable consis-
tent with the National Hazardous Substance Response Plan, and shall include, 
at a minimum, the assignment of responsibility for coordinating response ac-
tions with the issuance of administrative orders, enforcement of standards and 
permits, the gathering of information, and other imminent hazard and emer-
gency powers. 
42 U.S.C. § 9606(c) (Supp. v 1981). Guidelines were finally issued in the form of a "policy 
statement" on May 13, 1982. 47 Fed. Reg. 20,664 (1982). 
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Hazardous Waste, Rita Lavelle,23 followed by the resignation of 
Administrator Ann (Gorsuch) Burford on March 9, 1983.24 
With the appointment of William Ruckelshaus as Adminis-
tratcr and the installation of a new "team,"25 the Superfund 
program has been redefined, and the EPA is, in some ways, 
coming to grips with its regulatory responsibilities. The Agency 
has recently taken steps to study cleanup of a number of loca-
tions,26 and has even commenced Superfund-financed cleanup at 
some sites under section 107.27 However, section 106 enforcement 
actions seeking injunctive relief, brought to encourage a volun-
tary assumption of some liability, continue to playa dominant 
role in the Administration's hazardous waste policy. In fact, the 
EPA's general policy of using injunctive relief requiring private 
cleanup under section 106, in lieu of taking direct governmental 
action,28 and then seeking reimbursement under section 107, was 
recently reiterated.29 Current policy statements continue to em-
23. See 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) (April 9, 1982). La Velie was forced to resign, in part 
because of her criticism of EPA's enforcement policy which chooses litigation over viable 
alternatives for cleanup. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8,1983, at AI, col. 1. LaVelle is the only EPA 
official against whom criminal charges have been brought. She was charged with per-
jury in conjunction with the Congressional investigation of her administration of the 
Fund. See Chi. Trib., Nov. 17, 1983, at § 1, 36, col. 1. It is becoming clear that her 
resignation did not end these administrative problems. 
24. N.Y. Times, March 10, 1983, at B12, col. 1. 
25. N.Y. Times, March 21, 1983, at AI, col. 6. After confirmation by the Senate, 
Ruckelshaus was sworn in on May 18, 1983. 14 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 91 (May 20, 1983). 
26. A well publicized example involves the EPA's study of the complex problem of 
dioxin contamination. Wash. Post, Dec. 16, 1983, at AI. 
27. One example is the Chem-Dyne site in Ohio. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 
No. C-1-82-840, slip op. (S.D. Ohio, Oct. 11, 1983). The limited extent of this cleanup is 
discussed infra text and notes at notes 150-54. 
28. See 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 820 (Oct. 15, 1982). The term "government response 
action" is used herein to indicate those actions known as "response" actions under 
§ 104(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (Supp. V 1981). Section 104(a)(1) authorizes 
government response: 
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial 
threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or 
substantial threat of release into the environment of any pollutant or contam-
inant which may present an imminent and substantial danger to the public 
health or welfare, the President is authorized to act, consistent with the na-
tional contingency plan, to remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for 
remedial action relating to such hazardous substance, pollutant, or contami-
nant at any time (including its removal from any contaminated natural re-
source), or take any other response measure consistent with the national con-
tingency plan which the President deems necessary to protect the public health 
or welfare or the environment. 
42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
29. L. M. Thomas & C. M. Price, Guidance Memorandum on Use and Issuance of 
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phasize the use of "administrative orders" or enforcement actions 
under section 106, as well as negotiated settlements with parties 
who are "potentially liable" under section 107, as a means of 
securing privately funded cleanup.3o 
More recently, the government has sought both injunctive re-
lief and a declaration of liability, blurring the line between section 
107 liability and any "liability" which arises under section 106.31 
By spending a relatively small amount of money for investigatory 
work or emergency measures, the government is able to seek a 
declaration of liability, as well as further remedial injunctive 
relief. The result, of course, will be the Agency's continued failure 
to exercise its full statutory authority to identify hazardous waste 
sites in need of cleanup and to implement a response strategy. 
Notwithstanding the significant question of whether fund-
financed cleanup should dominate the EPA program, the manner 
in which the EPA has circumvented CERCLA by relying on 
section 106 has raised questions as to how liability and the appro-
priate remedy should be determined. By asking the courts to use 
their injunctive powers to mandate costly and complex cleanup 
action, the EPA has failed to exercise its responsibility under 
CERCLA to determine appropriate and reasonable remedies be-
fore bringing a section 106 action. A liability determination is now 
sought by the EPA without having performed the necessary in-
vestigation according to the standards of the National Oil and 
Hazardous Waste Contingency Plan, and without having deter-
mined the appropriate remedy. Several problems flow from this 
approach. Cleanup plans should not be made without the 
thorough scientific investigation which can be done by the EPA, 
but can not be done by the courts. In addition, the financial duress 
of threatened "joint and several" liability may coerce settlement 
without proper identification of the environmental problem and 
an appropriate remedy. Moreover, the management of private 
companies requires the ability to forecast environmental respon-
sibilities and their financial consequences. Corporate planning 
requires substantive and consistent actions on the part of the 
Administrative Orders under Section 106(a)ofCERCLA (1983) [hereinafter cited as Section 
106 Memorandum]. 
3'0. I d. at 2. EPA, Cost Recovery Actions under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 41 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 11-43 (Oct. 14, 
1983) [hereinafter cited as Section 107 Memorandum]. 
31. E.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 80-5066-
CV-s-4, slip op. (W.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 1984). 
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EPA rather than the ad hoc approach that has characterized the 
Agency's actions under CERCLA to date. 
Judicial scrutiny of agency action is of course necessary, but 
should be limited to oversight of agency implementation of the 
statute. It is not a substitute for the EPA's assuming its obligation 
to proceed according to the statute and regulatory guidelines by 
either cleaning up hazardous waste sites and then seeking cost 
recovery from liable parties, or properly identifying the environ-
mental hazard and selecting an appropriate remedy before bring-
ing a section 106 action. 
It is the opinion of the author that rather than relying primar-
ily on the pursuit of injunctive relief under section 106, the statute 
contemplates that the Agency assume substantive cleanup re-
sponsibility by using the Superfund. At the very least, the EPA 
should not shirk its statutory authority to investigate a waste site 
and determine what remedies are necessary before bringing a 
section 106 action. This is a duty more appropriately performed by 
the EPA than the courts; nor should the courts circumvent Con-
gress' detailed liability scheme by deviating from the standards of 
section 107. Courts have only begun to construe the statute, and 
the scope of its strict liability provision is unclear, although the 
discussion which follows attempts to provide some definition. 
Greater judicial involvement is likely in the future, particularly 
since negotiated settlements will meet with lessening success as 
parties identified as "potentially responsible" choose to litigate 
the question of their "responsibility." 
In order to understand the effects of the EPA's reliance on its 
section 106 injunctive authority, this article will first examine the 
structure of CERCLA as approved by Congress, and how the Act 
has been implemented by the EPA.32 Second, the reasons that the 
EPA adopted its present enforcement strategy will be discussed.33 
Third, the results of this strategy will be examined.34 This section 
will focus on the real versus the reported progress made by the 
EPA; the extent to which the EPA program conflicts with Con-
gressional intent and previous cases which discuss the extent to 
which the common law can be relied upon to implement statutory 
environmental programs; the role of the National Oil and 
Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan in the EPA program; 
32. See infra text and notes at notes 36-126. 
33. See infra text and notes at notes 127-37. 
34. See infra text and notes at notes 144-206. 
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and the way in which section 106 liability has been defined by the 
courts. Finally, the future of the EPA's "voluntary liability" 
scheme will be discussed.35 
II. STRUCTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STATUTE 
CERCLA was designed to provide the federal government with 
a variety of regulatory tools to protect the public and the envi-
ronment from the release of hazardous waste. The Act is unique 
in that, under section 104 it gives the EPA authority to clean up 
hazardous waste36-termed government "response" action, 
which is paid for out of the "Superfund"-and then seek cost 
recovery from liable parties, under section 107.37 In addition, 
under section 106, the "imminent hazard, enforcement and emer-
gency response" provision, the government is authorized to se-
cure injunctive relief and "take other action ... as may be neces-
sary to protect public health and welfare and the environment" 
from the threat of hazardous waste releases.3s 
In implementing CERCLA, the Reagan Administration has 
relied on its section 106 authority to bring injunctive actions 
against potentially liable parties to obtain some degree of clean-
up, rather than clean up waste sites itself and then seek cost 
recovery from liable parties.39 By bringing injunctive actions 
under section 106, both the liability standards of section 107, and 
the cleanup standards contained in CERCLA regulations, such as 
the National Oil and Hazardous Waste Contingency Plan, are 
circumvented. While the EPA, under Administrator Ruckleshaus, 
has indicated that it plans to playa greater role in the formula-
tion of cleanup plans4°-either by performing cleanup itself, or by 
getting more involved in the determination of remedies in section 
106 actions-its basic approach will likely remain unaffected. 
A. Introduction to CERCLA: Section 107 Liability 
CERCLA authorizes government cleanup of inactive hazard-
ous waste sites, and establishes a procedure for recoupment of 
cleanup costs where "liable" parties can be found.41 If cleanup 
35. See infra text and notes at notes 207-217. 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (Supp. V 1981). 
37. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. v 1981); see in/ra text and notes at notes 41-64. 
38. 42 U.S.C. 9606(a) (Supp. v 1981); see infra text and notes at notes 65-73. 
39. See infra text and notes at notes 41-73, 78-173. 
40. See supra text and notes at notes 26-27. 
41 See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) 18, reprinted in 1981 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 10,250. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607 (Supp. V 1981). 
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costs can be recovered from a liable party, under section 107,42 the 
monies which are recovered and any other civil penalties are 
contributed to the "Superfund," which finances government 
cleanup.43 The fund is also supported by a tax on certain members 
of the petroleum and chemical industries.44 
CERCLA's broad "liability" provision, section 107, imposes lia-
bility for cleanup costs and for damage to natural resources on: 
(1) The owner and operator of a ... facility, 
(2) any person who at the time of disposal owned or operated 
any facility ... , 
(3) any person who . . . arranged . . . or arranged with a 
transporter for disposal or treatment ... at any facility ... 
and, 
(4) any person who accepts or accepted a hazardous sub-
stance for transport to . . . sites from which there is a 
release or a threatened release which causes the incur-
rence of response costS.45 
Defenses are also specifically enumerated and include establish-
ing that the environmental damage resulted from an act of God, 
an act of war, or, an act or omission of a third party, who is not an 
agent or employee and where the defendant exercised due care.46 
These defenses are specific and appear to limit the issues which 
may be litigated in a section 107 action.47 
Section 107 liability can be imposed in a number of ways. The 
statute contemplates, however, that for the most part, a section 
107 liability action will be brought against a potentially liable 
party by whoever cleaned up the waste site.48 Generally, that 
party would be the EPA, but an innocent party who cleaned up a 
waste site could also bring a section 107 action against a poten-
tially liable party for cost recovery.49 
42. 42 U.S.C. * 9607 (Supp. v 1981). 
43. 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b)(1)(B)-9631(E) (Supp. v 1981). 
44. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611, 4661 (Supp. v 1981). 
45. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. v 1981). 
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (Supp. v 1981). 
47. An exception would be a cost recovery action by a party who is also potentially 
liable. E.g. City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical, 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
48. This article focuses on liability for government response costs pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (Supp. v 1981). Standards for liability to "any other person" who 
incurs "necessary" response costs are set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(b) (Supp. v 1981). 
Parties may also seek cost recovery through the fund. 42 U.S.C. § 9612 (Supp. v 1981). The 
government then acquires, by subrogation, the right to proceed against a liable party. 42 
U.S.C. § 9612(c) (Supp. V 1981). Recovery may include costs and attorneys fees, without 
regard to other limitations on liability. 42 U.S.C. § 9612(c)(3) (Supp. V 1981). 
49. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(14)(3) (Supp. V 1981). 
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Section 107 liability was hotly debated by Congress.50 Senate 
Bill 1481 would have imposed absolute liability for any release of a 
hazardous substance except if "federally permitted."51 The House 
of Representatives, however, opted for a "hybrid liability" provi-
sion which imposed strict liability, but which flatly rejected the 
Senate's "zero release" approach-imposing liability for a release 
in any quantity.52 The Senate agreed to the liability approach of 
the House bill with one pertinent exception; a definition of "liable" 
was added, which made it clear that the standard of liability 
under Superfund was to be identical to the standard of liability 
under section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act for 
spills of oil and hazardous substances.53 
Section 311 defines statutory liability as the government's "ex-
clusive remedy" for recovery of oil spill cleanup costs,54 where a 
"harmful quantity" is discharged.55 The government is entitled to 
50. E.g. 126 CONGo REC. S15002-09 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statements of Sen. Williams, 
Sen. Helms, Sen. Jepsen, Sen. Simpson, Sen. Stafford and others). 
51. See S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(1) (1979); S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 
46-48 (1980). 
52. See 126 CONGo REC. H9158 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (statement of Rep. Madigan). As 
Congressman Madigan stated, commenting on H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980): 
I am sure that the Members are aware that this session of Congress was 
inundated by many proposals for 'superfunds,' 'ultrafunds,' and other as-
sorted funds to address various environmental problems. Many of these propos-
als were extremely broad and attempted to create new concepts of environmen-
tal law and toxic tort law. I have been concerned from the beginning that many 
proponents of this environmental legislation would bog the Congress down by 
insisting on new "zero release" environmental concepts and punitive and un-
reasonable liability provisions. The guiding philosophy behind these various 
legislative proposals was summed up by one of its principal architects at the 
Department of Justice who said, 'Government is perfectly prepared to punish 
the innocent for the sins of the guilty.' ... People in the Senate have made it 
quite clear that they intend to push the 'zero release' concept. That 'zero 
release' concept would serve as a regulatory tool against anything that escapes 
the four walls of a plant. 
126 CoNG. REC. H9158 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980). More recently, Ruckleshaus has ex-
pressed a need to define an "acceptable level of cleanup" which "com[es] short of zero 
risk." 14 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 809 (Sept. 9, 1983). 
53. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (Supp. V 1981). The standards of liability under § 311, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1321 (Supp. V 1981), are contained in § 311(b) and require establishing, "(1) a spill of (2) 
oil or a substance designated by EPA as 'hazardous,' (3) in a quantity determined by 
EPA to be harmful." The implementing regulations are found in 40 C.F.R. §§ 116-117 
(1982). Whether or not section 107 liability attaches will depend upon whether the release 
of a "harmful quantity," as defined by regulation under § 311, has occurred. Thus, 
whether the release is actually harmful is an appropriate issue in such litigation. See, 
e.g., United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., No. C-1-82-840, slip op. at 16 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 11, 
1983). 
54. United States v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 627 F.2d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1980) (Dixie 
Carriers l). 
55. United States v. Chevron Oil Co., 583 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1978). 
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recover its cleanup costs from designated parties subject only to 
certain enumerated defenses.56 Under section 311, recovery is 
limited to the amounts authorized by the statute, and cannot be 
expanded by reference to other statutes or common law.57 By 
detining CERCLA liability according to the limited liability stan-
dards imposed by section 311, Congress enacted a scheme of strict, 
but limited, liability under section 107. 
Thus, the compromise bill identified section 107 as a strict liabil-
ity provision, defined by the standard of liability under section 
311.58 Congress explained that under this standard, the govern-
ment was authorized to clean up sites, and was relieved of the 
difficult task of proving "fault" in establishing liability for cleanup 
costS.59 "Dimensionless" liability, however, was to be prevented by 
provisions limiting damage claims that may be paid out of the 
fund.so 
In addition to the limitations on section 107 liability which arise 
out of the imposition of the Clean Water Act section 311 standard 
of strict liability, section 107 itself also limits liability in a number 
of ways. The scope of CERCLA liability is further limited and 
56. Matter of Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1982). 
57. United States v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 627 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1980). 
58. Unfortunately, this seemingly clear congressional intent to impose strict liability, 
as defined by § 311, has not resulted in a clear identification of the circumstances under 
which liability may be established. While section 311 liability requires the release of a 
"harmful quantity" to impose liability, at least one court has rejected the use of this 
standard to determine the release which will trigger CERCLA liability. The district 
court in United States v. Wade noted that the § 311 standard refers to "water pollution," 
while CERCLA is "directed at the disposal of hazardous waste on land." United States v. 
Wade, No. 79-1426 slip op. (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1983). 
59. A Justice Department analysis of existing law concluded that proof of "causation" 
under existing tort principles precluded common law theories from permitting recovery 
from "responsible" parties. See DEPT. OF JUSTICE, LAND & NATURAL RESOURCES DIVI-
SION, THE SUPERFUND CONCEPT. REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON 
COMPENSATION FOR RELEASES OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES 24 (June, 1979). The proof 
of causation was cited as a principal rationale for the controversial bill (S. 1480) reported 
by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. See S. REP. No. 848 10-12, 
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). 
60. 126 CoNG. REG. H9158 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (statement of Rep. Madigan). 
Another area of concern was the possible retroactive effect of the liability provisions. 
Senator Madigan, commenting on H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) stated: 
Of particular concern to me and a number of my colleagues on the Commerce 
Committee were the liability issues of this legislation. Especially difficult were 
the ramifications of retroactive application of statutory liability provisions to 
past activities of potential defendants. As the committee report succinctly 
points out, the committee rejected any notion of absolute liability in this regard. 
While this may be somewhat a hybrid liability provision, it provides fundamen-
tal fairness. 
126 CONGo REC. H9158 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (statement of .Rep. Madigan). 
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defined by a requirement that "response" be consistent with the 
National Contingency Plan; that is, in order for the EPA, or other 
party that cleaned up a waste site, to recover its costs from a 
liable party, its cleanup must have been performed in a manner 
consistent with the guidelines set out in the National Con-
tingency Plan.61 Therefore, the selection of a proper remedy, and 
clarification of the statutory language identifying the persons 
who may be held liable will more precisely determine the scope of 
CERCLA liability. 
In addition, recovery from liable parties is "circumscribed by 
cost-effectiveness considerations":62 recovery cannot be obtained 
from liable parties for cleanup not performed in a cost-effective 
manner. In certain cases, liability is even limited to specific dollar 
amounts, provided action is not willful or certain safety standards 
are not violated.63 Finally, "federally permitted releases," which 
include those authorized by other environmental statutes, are 
exempt from CERCLA liability provisions.64 
Thus, while giving the EPA the necessary authority to clean up 
dangerous hazardous waste sites, Congress also established a 
detailed liability scheme which limits liability in a number of 
ways. The establishment of this scheme indicates that Congress 
did not intend to impose limitless liability. Rather, Congress in-
tended to permit cost-recovery only if certain conditions are met, 
and in any event, liability is limited by the section 311 standard 
and by section 107 itself. It can be easily inferred that Congress 
did not intend that the liability scheme it so carefully set out be 
circumvented. 
Congress felt an urgent need for legislation which would allow 
the EPA to clean up hazardous sites and subsequently recover 
cleanup costs. Concern about the hazardous waste problem obvi-
ously outweighed congressional concern over granting such sig-
nificant power to the EPA. Nevertheless, to the extent that liabil-
ity was limited and the EPA's power was circumscribed, those 
limitations were clearly viewed by Congress as necessary to a fair 
application of other CERCLA authorities. 
61. 42 u.s.c. § 9607(a)(4)(A), (B) (Supp. v 1981). 
62. 126 CONGo REC. H9156 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (statement of Rep. Staggers). 
63. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(I), (c)(2) (Supp. v 1981); McCastle v. Rollins Environmental 
Services, 514 F. Supp. 936 (M.D. La. 1981); see also United States v. Dixie Carriers, 696 
F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1980). 
64. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(j) (Supp. V 1981). 
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B. Emergency Abatement Authority: Section 106 
"The imminent hazard, enforcement and emergency response 
authorities" of section 106 was designed to give the President the 
power to respond to an emergency and abate an imminent threat 
which might otherwise endanger the public.65 Section 106(a) au-
thority is specifically limited to situations where "there may be an 
imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or 
welfare or the environment because of an actual or threatened 
release of a hazardous substance from a facility."66 The President 
may require the Attorney General of the United States to secure 
such relief as may be necessary to abate such danger or threat, 
and the district court of the United States in the district in which 
the threat occurs shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the 
public interest and the equities of the case may require. The Presi-
dent may also, after providing notice to the affected states, take 
other action under this section including, but not limited to issu-
ing such orders as may be necessary to protect public health and 
welfare and the environment.67 
Section 106 provides: 
When the President determines that there may be an immi-
nent and substantial endangerment to the public health or 
welfare or the environment because of a hazardous sub-
stance from a facility, he may require the Attorney General 
... to secure such relief as may be necessary ... [and] after 
notice to the effected State, take other action under this 
section ... as may be necessary to protect public health and 
welfare and the environment.68 
Guidelines are to be published for exercising this authority, and 
"emergency response actions" are to be consistent with the N a-
tional Oil and Hazardous Substance Contingency Plan, to the 
maximum extent possible.69 Section 106 apparently does not 
create new substantive liabilities. 
Other substantive bodies of law, including section 107, may 
direct implementation of the section.70 In addition, where liability 
will ultimately arise under section 107, section 106 may operate 
only to permit the government to minimize that potential liabil-
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 9706(c) (Supp. V 1981). 
66. [d. 
67. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
68. [d. 
69. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(c) (Supp. v 1981). 
70. United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
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ity, by controlling a release where increased harm is threatened. 
This is evidenced by the title "abatement authority" and by the 
statute's legislative history-Congress noted that by responding 
immediately to an emergency, the government could prevent 
harm from being "exacerbated by delay."71 Despite the language 
of section 106 and apparent congressional intent that It provide 
authority to reduce the threat of harm in emergency situations, 
the Administration apparently intends to treat it as a liability 
provision supplementing section 107, as previously noted. On pre-
liminary motions, courts have upheld section 106 claims which 
couple allegations of imminent and substantial endangerment 
with requests for injunctive relief, including cleanup of a remedial 
nature.72 Except in truly emergency situations, no section 106 
claim has been finally decided granting relief of this nature, how-
ever.73 
C. Other CERCLA Penalty Provisions 
CERCLA contains other miscellaneous penalty provisions. Sec-
tion 103(b) details the penalties which may be imposed (as well as 
limitations on those penalties) for failure to notify the govern-
ment of a known release.74 Section 107(c) prescribes civil penalties 
71. See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Session 28 (1980). 
72. E.g. Outboard Marine, 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Other cases suggest that 
section 106(a) may be more appropriately used in an emergency context. United States v. 
Price, No. 80-4101, slip op. (D.N.J. July 28, 1983). 
73. See infra text and notes at notes 178-206. 
74. 42 U.S.C. § 9403(b) (Supp. v 1981). This section states that: 
Any person 
(1) in charge of a vessel from which a hazardous substance is released, other 
than a federally permitted release, into or upon the navigable waters of the 
United States, adjoining shorelines or into or upon the waters of the contig-
uous zone, or 
(2) in charge of a vessel from which a hazardous substance is released, other 
than a federally permitted release, which may affect natural resources 
belonging to, pertaining to or under the exclusive management authority of 
the United States ... and who is otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States at the time of the release, or 
(3) in charge of a facility from which a hazardous substance is released, other 
than a federally permitted release, in a quantity equal to or greater than 
that determined pursuant to § 102 of this title who fails to notify immedi-
ately the appropriate agency of the United States government as soon as he 
has knowledge of such release shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than 
$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. 
42 U.S.C. § 9403(b) (Supp. v 1981). Furthermore, § 103(c) provides for similar penalties for 
failing to notify of the existence of an abandoned or inactive hazardous waste disposal 
area at which hazardous wastes were stored, treated or disposed. 42 U.S.C. § 9403(c) 
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for failure to comply with a section lO6(a) emergency order.75 
These penalty provisions appear to operate independently of sec-
tion 107 cleanup liability provisions,76 although the punitive 
damage provisions in section 107(c) apply to persons who are 
"liable for a release" and who violate "an order" under either 
section 104 or section 106.77 Only Section 107 prescribes cleanup 
liability and sets standards and criteria for the liability determi-
nation, further supporting the position that a determination of 
section 107 liability was intended to provide the exclusive remedy 
for obtaining cleanup by liable parties. 
D. The National Contingency Plan 
The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan 
(the Plan), required by CERCLA section 105, establishes proce-
dures, standards, and criteria for both the EPA and private par-
ties for responding to releases of hazardous waste and for clean-
ing up waste sites.78 The Plan was published as a regulation by 
the EPA on July 16, 1982 and has been amended by the addition of 
the National Priorities List which now identifies more than 400 
sites as targets for cleanup. 
The Agency published the proposed "National Priorities List" 
on December 30, 1982, and sites were added on subsequent occa-
sions.79 The list, which is to determine priorities for Agency re-
sponse actions under section 106, instead became a blueprint for 
EPA enforcement action. It was recently published as a final rule 
in substantially the same form as proposed.80 
Consistency with the Plan is the standard by which liability for 
cleanup is determined.81 Whether it is used to determine "how 
(Supp. v 1981). Compliance with § 103(b) and (c) has been aggravated by the delayed 
"clarification" by EPA of the duty to report abandoned waste sites under § 103(c) and the 
lack of any proposed rulemaking to clarify the reporting requirements of § 102. 
75. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (Supp. V 1981). 
76. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
77. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (Supp. V 1981). 
78. 41 Fed. Reg. 31,180-243 (1982) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300). The Plan was to 
have been promulgated by June 9,1981. The EPA, however, did not act until ordered to 
do so. See EDF v. Gorsuch, No. 81-2083, slip op. (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 1982). 
79. 47 Fed. Reg. 58,476-85 (1982). The list proposed 418 target sites. An earlier list of 114 
sites was published Oct. 23, 1981. EPA, Statement of Ann M. Gorsuch, Administrator of 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Oct. 23, 1981). On March 4, 1983, the Times 
Beach, Missouri dioxin site was added. 48 Fed. Reg. 9311 (1983). Other sites were added in 
a "first update" to the final list on Sept. 8, 1983. 48 Fed. Reg. 98,674 (1983). 
80. 47 Fed. Reg. 31,202-19 (1982) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300). 
81. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A), (B) (Supp. V 1981). 
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clean is clean" or to set the standard for cost recovery under 
section 107, the Plan applies to both government response under 
section 104, or private party cleanup when reimbursement from 
the fund will be sought under section 112 or if a liability claim will 
be asserted.82 
Subpart F of the Plan requires that the EPA follow a detailed 
series of steps related to a determination of the: 
1. Scope of the problem and extent of release.83 
2. Steps necessary to mitigate the release.84 
3. Feasibility of the proposed response and any adverse envi-
ronmental impact.85 
4. Detailed design of selected alternatives,8s and 
5. Cost-effective remedy.87 
Then, cost balancing is performed in order to determine priorities 
for fund expenditures.88 Thus, the plan establishes the appropri-
ate response where a release occurs or is threatened.89 It sets 
forth a step-by-step approach; each step involves a determination 
that a particular response is appropriate. An investigation relat-
ing to the proposed response is then authorized.90 
CERCLA prohibits government cleanup where a private party 
has assumed responsibility. The first "step," therefore, also in-
82. See id. 
83. 47 Fed. Reg. 31,216 (1982) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(d)). The Plan must 
include: 
(1) methods for discovering and investigating facilities where hazardous sub-
stances are located; 
(2) methods for evaluating and remedying releases or threatened releases; 
(3) methods and criteria for determining the appropriate extent of removal; 
(4) government roles and responsibilities; 
(5) provision for assuring availability of response equipment; 
(6) methods of assigning responsibility for reporting releases; 
(7) means of assuring cost-effectiveness of remedial action measures over the 
period of potential exposure; 
(8) (a) criteria for determining priorities, including a relative risk assessment; 
(b) identification of roles for private response organizations. 
84. [d. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(a)). 
85. [d. at 31,217 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(h)). 
86. [d. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(i)). 
87. [d. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(j)). 
88. [d. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(k)). 
89. The EPA has described this as a three-step process involving: (1) "initial investiga-
tion" ("preliminary assessment"), 47 Fed. Reg. 31,214 (1982) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
§ 300.64); (2) "screening" to determine whether "immediate response," id. § 300.64(a), or 
further investigation, id. § 300.65, is warranted; and (3) further investigation for 
nonemergency releases, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,215-16 (to be codified at §§ 300.66, 300.67(d), (e), 
300.68(e)-(i)). 
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (Supp. v 1981). 
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volves a determination that removal will not be "done properly by 
the owner or operator ... or ... (a) responsible party."9l 
Assuming that no private party has assumed responsibility, the 
Plan provides that the lead agency,92 usually the EPA, perform a 
"preliminary assessment," based on readily available informa-
tion.93 The assessment may include consideration of the nature 
and magnitude of the release as well as whether immediate re-
moval is necessary. The federal response must terminate if there 
is not a "release" of a "hazardous substance," "pollutant," or 
"contaminant" from a "vessel or facility" for which government 
action is authorized.94 
Next, after reviewing the preliminary assessment, the lead 
agency determines whether immediate removal is appropriate by 
examining whether such action "will prevent or mitigate immedi-
ate and significant risk of harm to health or to the environ-
ment."95 When the "significant risk" no longer exists and con-
taminated materials have been disposed of, "immediate removal" 
is complete.96 In most instances, immediate removal cannot ex-
ceed one million dollars cost or six months duration.97 
"Planned removal" may follow "immediate removal" when fur-
ther response, while equipment and resources are on site, would 
result in substantial cost savings,98 or, if the public or environ-
ment "will be at risk from exposure to hazardous substances."99 
Factors which the agency may consider are similar to those for 
immediate removal, although planned removal is apparently sub-
ject to a lesser "risk" standard.loo The governor of the affected 
state must request planned removal, and the state must partici-
pate in cost-sharing.10l The one million dollar/six-month limitation 
applies,102 and the action terminates when the risk is abated.lo3 
91. 47 Fed. Reg. 31,213 (1982) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.61(b». 
92. The" lead agency" provides the "on-scene coordinator" or "responsible official." 47 
Fed. Reg. 31,204 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.6). Subpart C of the Plan describes the 
appropriate response "organization." 47 Fed. Reg. 31,207-10 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
§ 300.31-.37). 
93. Section 106 Memorandum, supra note 29, at 11, 16. 
94. See 47 Fed. Reg. 31,214 (1982) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.64(a)(1), (2), (4), 
300.64(c». 
95. Id. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.64(a)). 
96. 47 Fed. Reg. 31,215 (1982) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.65(c». 
97. Id. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.65(d»; 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(1) (Supp. v 1981). 
98. 47 Fed. Reg. 31,215 (1982) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.67(a)(l)). 
99. Id. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.67(a)(2». 
100. See 47 Fed. Reg. 31,216 (1982) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.67(c». 
101. Id. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.67(b». 
102. Id. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.67(d), (e». 
103. Id. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.67(c». 
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While "planned removal" is not defined in the statute, the Plan 
indicates that it will provide "short term but not emergency 
response.I04 As already noted, the EPA has apparently distin-
guished its emergency power (immediate removal) from planned 
removal, which has a cost-effectiveness justification. It is not 
clear, however, that the statute allows the EPA to require state 
cost-sharing for any short term removal action which costs less 
than one million dollars.los The EPA has indicated that it has 
"discretion" to do so.HlG 
In the final step, the agency determines whether remedial ac-
tion should be taken.107 While the Plan addresses both removal 
and remedial action, "criteria for determining priorities ... based 
upon relative risk" and the "list ... of 'top priority response 
targets'" relate primarily to the latter.H)8 Similarly, under the 
statute, cost-effectiveness is required only for remedial action.I09 
It should be noted, however, that, according to the EPA, an 
104. 47 Fed. Reg. 31,181 (1982). 
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c) (Supp. v 1981). The statute requires state participation 
with respect to "remedial action." The authority to require participation for planned 
removal is not clear. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3) (Supp. v 1981). 
106. 47 Fed. Reg. 31,193 (1982). 
107. Remedial action is defined as: 
[T]hose actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addi-
tion to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a 
hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release 
of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger 
to present or future public health or welfare or the environment .... The term 
includes the costs of permanent relocation of residents and businesses and 
community facilities where the President determines that ... such relocation is 
more cost-effective than, and environmentally preferable to, the transportation, 
storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition offsite of hazardous sub-
stances, or may otherwise be necessary to protect the public health or welfare. 
The term does not include offsite transport of hazardous substances or the 
storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition offsite of such hazardous 
substances or contaminated materials unless the President determines that 
such actions (A) are more cost-effective than other remedial actions, (B) will 
create new capacity to manage, in compliance with subtitle C of the Solid Waste 
Disposal Act, hazardous substances in addition to those located at the affected 
facility, or (C) are necessary to protect public health or welfare or the environ-
ment from a present or potential risk which may be created by further exposure 
to the continued presence of such substances or materials. 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (Supp. v 1981). 
108. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(8)(A), (B) (Supp. v 1981). For removal actions, the Act requires 
that these criteria be applied "to the extent practicable." Id. § 9605(8)(A). The list of 
priority sites is discussed supra, text and notes at notes "79-80. 
109. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(7) (Supp. v 1981). 
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alternative remedial plan cannot be rejected on the basis of cost 
alone.uo 
The Plan establishes that remedial action is limited to, "releases 
on the National Priorities List that are consistent with [a] perma-
nent remedy to prevent or mitigate the migration of a release of 
hazardous substances into the environment."111 It is not clear 
that enforcement action will be limited to listed sites, however, 
because legal action to force private cleanup may be an alterna-
tive to government response and responsibility.l12 
The factors which will determine the appropriate type of reme-
dial action relate generally to the population at risk and the 
potential for migration of the hazardous substance.u3 A remedial 
investigation, including sampling and monitoring, is required.u4 
Alternatives for controlling the release, including a "no-action" 
alternative, must then be considered, based upon this inform a-
tion.u5 The alternatives are evaluated by an "initial screening"116 
and then by a more detailed analysis.117 Factors which are consid-
ered include cost,118 effectiveness,119 and the engineering feasibil-
ity of the design,120 as well as any adverse environmental conse-
quences of the action.121 
In the detailed analysis, engineering and cost-effectiveness are 
again considered.122 Methods for mitigating adverse impacts and 
costs are determined,123 and new data may be gathered, if neces-
sary.l24 
110. 47 Fed. Reg. 31,185 (1982); see id. at 31,217 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(j». 
Under subsection (j), the EPA must select the cost-effective alternative, but it must 
effectively mitigate and minimize the threat to health or the environment. 
111. 47 Fed. Reg. 31,216 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(a». 
112. See id. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(c». It is notable that cost balancing 
considerations, which are relevant to the listing process, are not applicable to private 
cleanup. [d. 
113. See id., 40 C.F .. R. §§ 300.68(e)(1) ("initial" action), 300.68(e)(2) ("source control"), and 
300.68(e)(3) ("off-site" action). 
114. [d. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(f). 
115. [d. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(g». 
116. [d. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(h». 
117. [d. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(i)). 
118. The Plan provides for rejecting alternatives which are no more effective than 
alternatives which are cheaper by an "order of magnitude." 47 Fed. Reg. 31,217 (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(h)(1». 
119. [d. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(h)(2». 
120. [d. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(h)(3». 
121. [d. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(h)(2)(i». 
122. [d. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(i)(2)(A)-(E)). 
123. [d. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(i)(2)(E». 
124. [d. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(i)(3». 
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The Plan makes repeated reference to "voluntary" private 
party action and apparently views any means by which the gov-
ernment can secure private party cleanup, including legal action, 
to be an "alternative" to government cleanup and subsequent 
cost recovery under the Act.l25 Thus, within the very document 
which outlines response procedures, the EPA has carefully 
guarded its section 106 enforcement tool, paralleling earlier Ad-
ministration policy.l26 Despite recent EPA statements to the 
contrary, the EPA will likely continue to exercise this "alterna-
tive." 
E. EPA Reliance on 'Voluntary" Liability: Reasons and 
Prognosis. 
1. Factors Contributing to EPA Reliance on Section 106. 
The EPA's continued reliance on "voluntary cleanup" to im-
plement Superfund raises a number of questions. Perhaps most 
significantly, the EPA's early inclination to choose judicial relief 
in lieu of making the decisions itself as to the appropriate remedy 
raises a question as to why the EPA would elect litigation where 
it has the authority to determine appropriate cleanup and then 
seek a liability determination or indemnification. 
In part, a lack of knowledge concerning groundwater contami-
nation posed by abandoned landfills contributes to these attempts 
to shift responsibility. Determining whether contamination of soil 
will result in contamination of groundwater is more difficult than 
predicting threats to surface water.127 Groundwater flow is far 
less predictable and understood than are river and lake currents, 
or wind and weather patterns.l28 Determining the direction, rate, 
and characteristics of groundwater flow requires an intensive 
hydrogeological investigation. Those investigations may show 
125. See, e.g., 47 Fed. Reg. 31,216 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(c». That section 
provides that "judicial or administrative action may be an alternative to government 
cleanup." Another possible objective of judicial action may be to recover anticipated 
cleanup costs from the liable party before government cleanup. 
126. See, e.g., Brown, EPA Pre-litigation Enforcement Strategy in Hazardous Waste 
Cases, 14 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 149-152 (May 27, 1983). 
127. E.g. United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1334, 1340 (S.D. Ind. 
1982). The policy which allows partial cleanup has been challenged as possibly allowing 
responsible parties to escape liability for groundwater contamination. 14 ENV'T REP. 
(BNA) 1054 (Oct. 21, 1983). See also Mercer,.Groundwater_Pollution Control in GROUND-
WATER POLLUTION IN EUROPE 1, 1 (J. Cole ed. 1974). 
128. [d. 
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that the geologic strata have effectively confined the pollutants, 
or removed them from the groundwater by a process known as 
adsorbtion or attenuation.l29 In other instances, a contaminated 
groundwater plume may not threaten a drinking water supply. 
These difficulties in predicting the extent of groundwater con-
tamination could partly explain the EPA's reluctance to accept 
the responsibility of taking direct action, and its unwillingness to 
properly identify environmental hazards and remedial plans. 
The Administration's reliance on section 106 to coerce volun-
tary liability may, in fact, result from a deliberate effort to cir-
cumvent the intent of Congress and implement policies of the 
Justice Department.l3o The Justice Department, concluding that 
existing statutory and common law forms of relief were inade-
quate and that an absolute liability provision for any release of a 
hazardous substance was necessary and appropriate,l3l urged 
Congress to pass a strict liability hazardous waste bill with a 
"zero-release" provision. This would have imposed absolute liabil-
ity for the disposal of any amount of hazardous material.132 This 
was rejected, however, first in the House and then on the Senate 
floor.133 In its place, a bill which exempts federally permitted 
releases and, furthermore, adopts the standard of liability under 
section 311 of the Clean Water Act, was adopted.l34 That provi-
sion provides that liability attaches only when a "harmful 
quantity" -an amount to be determined by EPA regulations-is 
released.l35 Those regulations establish the "harmful quantities" 
of various compounds, depending upon the class and relative 
toxicity of those materials.l36 Thus, the release of one pound of 
DDT in a twenty-four hour period may be a harmful quantity 
while a release of 1,000 pounds of xylenol or 5,000 pounds of 
hydrochloric acid in a twenty-four hour period is a harmful 
quantity.137 
129. Smith, Flow Tracing Using Isotopes, in GROUNDWATER POLLUTION IN EUROPE 
377, 377 (J. Cole ed. 1974). 
130. See, e.g., DEPT. OF JUSTICE, LAND & NATURAL RESOURCES DIVISION, THE SU-
PERFUND CONCEPT. REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON COMPENSATION FOR 
RELEASES OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES (June, 1979). 
131. I d. at 152. 
132. Id. 
133. See supra text and notes at notes 50-60. 
134. Id. 
135. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0(1), (b)(3) (Supp. v 1981). 
136. 40 C.F.R. § 117.3 (1983). See also 48 Fed. Reg. 23,552-70 (1983) (proposal to adjust 
reportable quantities under Superfund). 
137. 40 C.F.R. § 117.3 (1983). 
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The use of section 106 by the EPA to obtain injunctive relief, 
rather than cleaning up and seeking a section 107 liability deter-
mination, allows the Department of Justice to enforce zero-
release concepts under CERCLA. Because the court relies on 
equitable principles in determining the relief available to the 
government, it is not bound to the standards contained in the 
statute. Under a zero-release standard, the government can estab-
lish liability more easily than under the section 311 "harmful 
quantity" standard. Thus, the Administration's program accom-
modates the policies urged by the Justice Department, including 
those not included in the adopted bill. 
2. "Voluntary Liability" Summary and Prognosis 
As discussed above, the EPA has shunned its authority to clean 
up hazardous waste sites and seek cost-recovery. Instead, it has 
relied on its section 106 authority to bring injunctive actions 
against potentially liable parties in an attempt to coerce a "volun-
tary" assumption of liability, and reach a settlement in which 
some degree of cleanup responsibility is assumed. If a settlement 
is not reached, then the EPA would ask the court to construct a 
remedy. 
Despite its apparent about-face in April 1983, announcing an 
intention to proceed with fund-financed response and cost recov-
ery under its section 107 authority,l38 the EPA's efforts to coerce 
private party cleanup will probably continue unaffected. The 
EPA's announced intention to use its section 107 authority to 
clean up sites and then recover the costs conflicts not only with its 
often repeated "section 106" policy, but with its own actions as 
well. It continues to rely on its section 106 authority to obtain 
private party assumption of liability, and is performing only min-
imal fund-financed cleanup.l39 In addition to whatever policy rea-
sons the EPA had for choosing this approach, there are a number 
of significant reasons why fund-financed cleanup would be 
avoided in the future: EPA cleanup often faces public distrust and 
hostility;l40 potentially responsible parties have not always "vol-
138. The announcement was made by the Justice Department. 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 
2344-45 (April 22, 1983). 
139. As of May, 1983, only one fund financed cleanup, at a Lehigh Pennsylvania 
transformer site, was completed. Address by Stephen D. Ramsay, Chief, Land and 
Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, Superfund Update: 
Cleanup Lessons Learned, Conference sponsored by Inside EPA Weekly Report and the 
Center for Energy and Environmental Management (May 17, 1983). 
140. Strong opposition to an EPA proposal to clean up PCBs in Waukegan Harbor was 
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unteered" to pay the cost of cleanup and response action at vari-
ous sit~s appears stalemated;141 the EPA is confronted with the 
difficulty of designing environmentally effective, cost-effective 
remedies; finally, to the extent that the EPA identifies a remedy, 
it must still obtain state assurances that ten percenV42 of the 
costs will be paid, and that the state will assume long-term opera-
tion and maintenance responsibilities.l43 These impediments may 
be the primary,reason the EPA has sought to use the courts to 
establish private party liability. Thus, the current EPA strategy 
is likely to continue. The results and effects of this strategy will 
now be examined. 
III. VOLUNTARY LIABILITY: THE RESULTS 
The National Priorities LisV44 and accompanying text appear 
to outline the EPA's accomplishments in the first two years of 
Superfund implementation. Although at first glance the List indi-
cates significant progress, a look beyond the numbers reveals a 
less flattering portrait of the EPA's success. Most significantly, 
the Agency's use of section 106 has begun to face judicial chal-
lenge, with very mixed results. 
A. The Success of ''Voluntary'' or Negotiated Settlements 
The preamble to the proposed National Priorities List indicated 
that in December, 1980, private parties had agreed to perform 
cleanup at some twenty-five abandoned or inactive hazardous 
waste sites.l45 Today, cleanup is reported to be underway at more 
than 180 sites,146 That number may be misleading, however. The 
EPA has announced that government response action has com-
menced at many sites where parallel enforcement action is 
underway.147 In most instances, however, "response" has appar-
presented at an EPA sponsored public meeting (March 14, 1984), and is reflected in an 
editorial in the local newspaper, "The EPAs latest cleanup idea, a $20.1 million mon-
strosity not only would delay the [cleanup] operation but is flawed to the point of 
flippancy." News Sun, March 20, 1984, at 8A, col. 1. 
141. E.g. id. 
142. The required contribution at state owned sites is 50%. 42 U.S.C. § 960(c)(3) (Supp. 
V 1981). 
143. Id. 
144. See supra text and notes at notes 79-80. 
145. 47 Fed. Reg. 58,481 (1982). 
146. 48 Fed. Reg. 40,672-75 (1983). 
147. Id. at 40,661. 
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ently been limited to investigation and study, without implemen-
tation of any remedial action.148 That number also includes sites 
where voluntary cleanup (cleanup pursuant to a settlement 
agreement)149 may be occurring. Unfortunately, the extent of this 
reported cleanup may be inadequate at many of these sites. 
For example, at the Chern-Dyne site in Hamilton, Ohio, the 
National Priorities List indicates that a private party response, a 
government response, and an enforcement action are all taking 
place.15o In fact, the voluntary response for this site, which re-
sulted from a settlement agreement with the government, con-
sists of a cash contribution by settling generators toward a fund 
to abate surface water contamination from the site.151 These past 
generators of hazardous waste also agreed to fund a study of the 
potential groundwater migration.152 The government's section 
106 enforcement action against the non-settling generators is 
limited to the surface water contamination problem.153 Both the 
complaint filed by the government against these companies and 
the separate settlement agreement purposely avoid the ground-
water contamination liability question. While the parties are not 
released from liability for any groundwater contamination, which 
may be the subject of a later action, that the EPA failed to include 
groundwater contamination in its enforcement action demon-
strates that EPA action, as indicated by the National Priorities 
List, may be inadequate. 
Chern-Dyne may be typical of the "successful" use of EPA's 
enforcement strategy. Where there are many generators who are 
named as defendants, the government promises not to bring suit 
in exchange for a nominal cash contribution by each generator.l54 
The generators thus avoid substantial litigation costs. A company 
148. E.g. id. at 40,661; supra note 139. 
149. For the purpose of tabulating "voluntary" response, the EPA counts only cleanup 
taken pursuant to a consent order or agreement to which it is a party. Id. 
150. Id. at 40,670. 
151. 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 597 (Sept. 3, 1982). See also United States v. Seymour 
Recycling Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (the court approved a settlement 
agreement providing only for surface cleanup). 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. For example, a $10 million cleanup, involving two hundred generators, would 
require a contribution of $50 thousand from each. Generator groups have sometimes 
agreed to apportion the contribution toward settlement on the basis of the volume of 
waste contributed to a site; the agreements may also reduce the relative share to the 
extent that a generator's waste is no longer on-site. Address by Barbara A. Hindin, 
Senior Attorney, ACRO Metals Company, Chicago Bar Association Environmental Law 
Committee (Nov. 1, 1983). 
1984] IMPLEMENTATION OF SUPERFUND 467 
has an incentive to pay an amount which is less than the cost of 
defense, thus minimizing costs and avoiding any adverse public-
ity that may be associated with defending these lawsuits. 
Thus, although it may appear that substantial progress is being 
made in cleaning up sites on the National Priorities List, actual 
cleanup may be inadequate at many of those sites. By settling 
with liable parties in a section 106 action, the EPA makes it 
appear that a site is being cleaned up, while avoiding the rigorous 
standards imposed by CERCLA and the Plan for taking direct 
action to respond to releases. This circumvention of Congressional 
intent will now be examined. 
B. Ad Hoc Decisions on Environmental Standards Conflict with 
Congressional Policy and Judicial Precedent 
The statute does not contemplate that the government would 
shirk its responsibility to determine the necessity for cleanup and 
to select an appropriate remedy. By authorizing cleanup and 
subsequent cost recovery, it was the clear intent of Congress that 
the government not resort first to the courts, thus delaying 
cleanup action.155 Furthermore, while most of the "standards" for 
government cleanup under section 107 and the Plan will apply, 
courts will likely be called upon to interpret and apply those 
standards and to determine the appropriate extent of remedy on 
an ad hoc basis. They will be required to determine liability and 
impose remedies based on considerations which are outside the 
statute's express provisions. 
Recent government efforts to complete preparation of a reme-
dial investigation and feasibility study before seeking out poten-
tially liable partiesl56 to implement the scheme are improving on 
the earlier ad hoc approach. However, courts have already dem-
onstrated an inclination to fashion a new "federal common law" to 
fill "gaps" in CERCLA, where it is the EPA's failure to fulfill its 
administrative obligation to design a remedy-not the statute 
itself-that has left a gap.157 The Supreme Court rejected such an 
155. At least one government official has argued that litigation to secure private 
cleanup would not delay cleanup, however. See Memorandum from Jeffrey G. Miller, 
EPA, to Echardt C. Beck (Dec. 18, 1980) (on file with the EPA and the author). Miller 
suggested that a pre-cleanup enforcement action would not involve the "difficult issues" 
of joint and several liability that might be raised in a "recovery action" (a suit to recover 
fund monies after cleanup). Id. at 3. The basis for this conclusion is unclear. 
156. 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2344-45 (April 22, 1983). 
157. E.g. United States v. Wade, No. 79-1426, slip op. (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
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ad hoc approach to water pollution control in City of Milwaukee v. 
Illinois & Michigan (Milwaukee II),158 in which Illinois argued that 
Milwaukee's discharge of sewage into Lake Michigan not only 
violated the Clean Water Act, but constituted a federal common 
law nuisance as well. The Court held that in establishing a com-
prehensive scheme for establishing water pollution liability, Con-
gress preempted the common law doctrine of nuisance as applied 
to water pollution control,159 Other courts have followed the Su-
preme Court's lead in cases involving hazardous waste control 
under RCRA.160 It may be argued that in a similar manner, 
Congress expressed its will that the courts not resort to common 
law principles in determining liability for the release of hazardous 
waste. Rather, the comprehensive liability scheme which it care-
fully set out in CERCLA section 107 should be followed. Adopting 
this reasoning, the opinion in United States v. Outboard Marine 
Corp. warns against "recourse to fed~ral common law nuisance" 
under the guise of section 106(a), and refers to section 107 as the 
statute's "main liability-creating provision."161 The Administra-
tion's reliance on section 106 to coerce parties into assuming 
liability, or the imposition of liability without a careful determina-
tion of remedy, may, therefore, directly violate CERCLA. 
C. The EPA Has Ignored the Plan By Using the Courts to 
Establish the Appropriate Degree of Cleanup 
Another important factor in examining the success of the 
EPA's enforcement program is the role of the National Oil and 
Hazardous Response Contingency Plan.162 Enforcement actions 
which attempt to establish liability without a showing of "consis-
tency" with the Plan or other guidelines required by the Act 
appear to violate the language of the Act,163 
Subpart F of the Plan was intended to provide "a detailed 
158. 451 U.S. 304 (1981). The Supreme Court has since held that the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976) (FWPCA) has "entirely preempted" 
the area of water pollution. Middlesex City Sewage Auth. v. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1,22 
1983). 
159. See 453 U.S. at 22 (citing Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981». 
160. United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981). 
161. Outboard Marine, 556 F. Supp. at 56, 57. 
162. See supra text and notes at notes 78-126. 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (Supp. V 1981). 
163. "The plan will be a comprehensive document detailing emergency response and 
remedial action procedures, including methods of discovery and investigation, methods 
for evaluating and remedying environmental emergencies and appropriate roles for 
governmental and private entities. The plan will contain guidance on cost-effectiveness." 
126 CoNG. REC. S14,965 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph). 
1984] IMPLEMENTATION OF SUPERFUND 469 
systematic procedure" for implementing remedial response and 
for determining the appropriate extent of remedy.l64 The initial 
screening is intended to eliminate costly, ineffective, unfeasible or 
environmentally harmful alternatives from consideration.165 
Then, the available alternatives are analyzed in detail. Emphasis 
is placed on both effectiveness and cost, including the cost of 
mitigating any environmental harm caused by the remedy.l66 
The systematic approach called for by the Plan is consistent 
with that required by other environmental statutes. Under the 
Clean Water Act, general national standards are required and 
have been adopted for many industries.167 Similar industry 
specific and national regulations are called for, and have been 
adopted under the Clean Air Act,t66 as well as the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act.169 Uniform national ambient air 
quality standards have also been adopted under the Clean Air 
Act,170 and the EPA has adopted criteria for minimum require-
ments of state-adopted water quality standards under the Clean 
Water Act.l7l Thus, in each of the other principal federal envi-
ronmental statutes, the Agency has been charged with the re-
sponsibility to adopt, and has adopted, appropriate standards to 
protect the public health. While states are allowed to adopt more 
stringent standards,172 Milwaukee II makes it clear that common 
law concepts will not regulate pollutant discharges.173 Federal 
and state programs capable of addressing health, economic, and 
technological concerns now exist to determine the standards 
which are required. 
The criteria to be used in a national contingency plan under 
CERCLA are not focused upon the site-specific environmental 
considerations, as are the regulations which have been adopted 
under the other environmental statutes.174 To the extent that it 
164. See 47 Fed. Reg. 31,187 (1982); supra text and notes at notes 83-124. 
165. See id. at 31,184. 
166. See id. at 31,185. 
167. See DuPont v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); American Meat Institute v. EPA, 526 
F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975); see also Fort, The Necessary Demise of Federal Common Law 
Nuisance, 12 LOYOLA U.L.J. 131, 147 n.89 (1981). 
168. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (Supp. v 1981); e.g. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 
F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
169. 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (Supp. v 1981); 47 Fed. Reg. 32,274 (1982). 
170. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (Supp. v 1981); 40 C.F.R. § 50 (1982). 
171. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (1976); 40 C.F.R. § 130 (1982). 
172. E.g. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976). 
173. See supra text and note at note 58. 
174. See supra text and notes at notes 83-124. 
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outlines at least a procedure for determining the appropriate 
response at any given site, however, that guidance and the rela-
tionship of CERCLA to these other environmental schemes is 
ignored by the EPA's use of section 106(a). 
D. The Imposition of Liability Under Section 106: Judicial 
Interpretation 
One of the most significant effects of EPA reliance on section 
106 has been the circumvention of the comprehensive liability 
scheme set out by Congress in section 107.175 Because section 106 
actions are brought in equity, courts have not felt bound to the 
section 107 liability standards.176 The result has been judicial 
conflict and confusion over the degree to which the courts can look 
outside the statute to determine the scope ofCERCLA section 106 
liability. 
The problems which flow from the court's failure to refer to 
section 107 in mandating private cleanup under section 106-
difficulty in business planning, circumvention of Congressional 
intent, judicial confusion, and the inequity of imposing liability 
upon individuals and businesses not necessarily liable under 
section 107-would be alleviated if the courts stayed within the 
standards carefully established by Congress for determining 
CERCLA liability. Liability under section 311 of the Clean Water 
Act has been carefully limited to that "expressly provided" by the 
statute.177 Portions of CERCLA which define section 107 liability 
by reference to Clean Water Act section 311 should be similarly 
interpreted, and would be rendered meaningless if courts felt free 
to imply liabilities beyond those expressly set forth in the Act. 
Courts have recognized that limitations on section 311 liability 
are applicable to CERCLA liability,178 and the liability language 
of the Act has been strictly construed.179 Yet, the EPA's persis-
tent efforts to rely on section 106 enforcement has resulted in a 
more recent judicial trend which expands CERCLA's scope. The 
second district court in United States v. Wade (Wade II) suggests 
that "federal common law" can define the scope of CERCLA 
liability.lso In holding that common law principles of joint and 
175. See supra text and notes at notes 41-64. 
176. See infra text and notes at notes 178-204. 
177. United States v. Dixie Carriers, 696 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1980). 
178. McCastle v. Rollins Environmental Services, 514 F. Supp. 936 (M.D. La. 1981). 
179. State ex rei. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1306 (N.D. Ohio 1983). 
180. United States v. Wade, No. 79-1426, slip op. (E.D. Pa Dec. 22, 1983). 
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several liability could be applied in a CERCLA section 106 action, 
the Wade II court opened the door to the imposition of other 
"federal common law" liability principles in such actions. 
On the other hand, the district court in McCastle v. Rollins18i 
indicated in dicta that "recovery is limited" under CERCLA by 
the scope of liability expressly provided for in the statute.182 Rele-
vant to its determination that the complained of "fumes and 
odors" were not "hazardous substances" under the statute were 
"limitations" of CERCLA and provisions which preserve "other 
Federal or State law."183 
More recently, courts have been asked to determine who may 
be held liable under the statute, and under what circumstances.184 
As discussed above, many suits seeking recovery of cleanup costs 
from "liable" parties under section 107 have resulted in settle-
ment agreements which provide for private cleanup or a cash 
contribution to cleanup costs. These settlements agreements sug-
gest that the parties who may be held strictly liable under the 
section understand their potential liability, and see few oppor-
tunities for successfully litigating the liability question. It is clear 
to parties in a section 107 action who is liable under that provision 
to allow for settlement in most cases. 
With respect to any liability which may exist under section 
106(a), the law is less certain. Since section 106 was not designed 
as a liability provision, it is unclear from the face of the statute 
who may be the target of a section 106 action, what the extent of 
their liability would be, and whether independent liability exists 
under section 106 at all. For example, in ruling on an earlier 
motion to dismiss in United States v. Wade (Wade 1),185 the district 
court refused to find that section 106 supports a cause of action 
against "past" generators, stating that section 106 is an "emer-
gency" provision.186 This view, however, is partly contradicted by 
United States v. Price. 187 While the Price court held that section 
181. McCastle v. Rollins Environmental Services, 514 F. Supp. 936 (M.D. La. 1981). 
182. [d. at 940. Rollins was a class action suit based on state nuisance law. The issue 
before the court was whether removal was proper. The plaintiff had sued to enjoin the 
use of a hazardous waste landfill. The defendant removed to federal court, arguing that 
RCRA issues were raised. The court found RCRA not applicable (because notice re-
quirements were not met), and then considered CERCLA applicability. [d. at 939. 
183. 514 F. Supp. at 938. 
184. E.g. United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Ind. 1982). 
185. United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
186. [d. at 794. 
187. 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981). 
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106 can be used to sue "past off-site generators of hazardous 
waste" where "immediate action" is required as a result of an 
"imminent and substantial endangerment,"188 it nevertheless 
ruled that use of section 106(a) was not intended to be limited to 
emergency situations.189 
On the other hand, the court in United States v. Reilly Tar & 
Chemical COrp.l90 upheld a section 106(a) action against a past 
off-site generator for remedial cleanup without relying on a 
finding of an emergency.191 The complaint sought recovery of 
response costs already incurred and injunctive relief, alleging the 
continuing transport of contaminants. The opinion suggests that 
these conditions present an emergency situation,192 although the 
court did not premise its relief on such findings. Because section 
107 "liability" was addressed in conjunction with the section 106 
cause of action, and the two statutory provisions were not distin-
guished, however, the opinion provides little guidance on the 
question of whether independent liability exists under section 
106.193 Furthermore, the court suggested that section 106 could 
"apply" to persons who do not fall within the strict language of 
section 107.194 Thus, a liability determination under section 107 
may be irrelevant to a determination of who must obey a section 
106 order. 
Other language in Reilly Tar, however, suggests that CERCLA 
should not be narrowly construed,195 Discussing whether prior 
188. Id. at 1646 (emphasis added). 
189. Id. 
190. 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982). 
191. Id. at 1113. The court rejected an argument that section 106 is "only jurisdic-
tional," drawing analogy to cases under section 7003 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. v 
1981). 546 F. Supp. at 1113. See also Cohen v. EPA, 19 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1377 (D. D.C. 
1983). Cohen is a Freedom of Information Act, (5 U.S.C. § 522 (1982», case involving the 
EPA's obligation to produce the names of persons who had received CERCLA notice 
letters, informing them of potential liability and demanding cleanup. The court, in dicta, 
stated: "Section 106(a) allows EPA the option of filing suit or issuing administrative 
orders to compel a responsible party to abate hazardous activities ... [W]ilful violation 
... can result in significant monetary penalties including punitive damages." Id. at 1378. 
Cohen suggests that the hazardous activity must be ongoing. 
192. Id. at 1114. 
193. E.g. id. at 1111. 
194. Id. at 1113. 
195. The Reilly court stated that "CERCLA should be given a broad and liberal 
construction." I d. at 1112. On the other hand, the court stated that section 106(a) "should 
not become a substitute for other reasonably available response mechanisms." Id. at 1114. 
See also State ex rei. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp 1300, 1306 (N.D. Ohio 1983). United 
States v. Outboard Marine Corp. suggests that the "broad reading" standard applies to 
the section 106(a) prerequisite that an imminent and substantial endangerment be 
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owners of a hazardous waste site could be subject to section 106(a) 
authority, the court noted that section 106 is "broader in scope" 
than section 7003 of RCRA and that section 106 contains "no 
limitations" on the class of persons within its reach.1OO Neverthe-
less, this discussion of section 106 suggests that it is not a liability 
provision, and while its "reach" may be unlimited the liability 
determination must derive from another substantive body of law. 
Thus, section 107, despite contrary language in Reilly,197 may 
restrict the parties who may be held liable for cleanup under 
CERCLA to those who fall clearly within the express terms of 
that section. 
The court in United States v. Outboard Marine COrp.198 followed 
Reilly Tar. The United States sought injunctive relief under sec-
tion 106(a) against Outboard Marine (OMC) as owner of the site. 
The court appeared to accept OMC's arguments that section 106 is 
"jurisdictional,"199 and requires reference to another substantive 
body of law.2°O However, "while not suggesting that section 107 of 
CERCLAis the sole substantive basis for section 106(a) actions," 
it noted that OMC "appears to be within the class of persons liable 
under section 107."201 The court also found that the government 
sufficiently alleged an emergency.202 The court found that section 
106 did not "create liability," and would apparently require a 
separate substantive basis for a section 106(a) action. While sec-
tion 107 may provide that basis, the court stated: 
This court is hesitant to rely only on "the public interest and 
the equities of the case" in determining the reach of section 
l06(a). Recourse to the federal common law of nuisance 
seems to be foreclosed by Milwaukee II. On the other hand, 
Congress included this imminent hazard authority in its 
CERCLA design, and it should be given effect.203 
The court then referred to "section 107, the main liability creating 
threatened, while it cautions against an expansion ofliability by, for example, recourse 
to federal common law nuisance. 556 F. Supp. 54, 57 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
196. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1111 (D. Minn. 
1982). 
197. E.g. id. at 1112. 
198. 556 F. Supp. 54, 58 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
199. [d. at 55-56. 
200. See id. at 56. 
201. [d. 
202. [d. at 57. 
203. [d. 
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provision," in determining "who ... [was] intended to be liable in 
an action under 106(a)."204 
Thus, although cases such as Wade II indicate a trend toward 
expanding CERCLA liability beyond the scope of section 107, 
many courts are holding that liability determinations in a section 
106 action must be made with reference to section 107. These 
courts are rightly finding that Congress did not intend that the 
EPA exercise such broad discretion in determining who will be 
held liable for waste site cleanup that the liability scheme set out 
by C'.ongress is circumvented. In the first real test of the Agency's 
discretion with respect to implementation of CERCLA, the Dis-
trict of Columbia District Court adopted this reasoning. InEDF v. 
Gorsuch,205 the Environmental Defense Fund sued to force pro-
mulgation of the National Contingency Plan, required by CERCLA 
section 105. The court agreed that a plan was required, stating: 
Congress has not provided the Agency with the type of dis-
cretion it evidently desires and contends for in this case. We 
are bound to effectuate the legislative will. If the EPA desires 
an element of flexibility in its operations, the Agency must 
look to Congress and not the CourtS.206 
IV. THE FUTURE OF "VOLUNTARY LIABILITY" 
With perhaps the exception of Wade II, the Superfund cases are 
consistent with others which look increasingly to the environ-
mental statutes and regulations promulgated thereunder, in 
making liability determinations. The Supreme Court in Mil-
waukee II rejected the ad hoc approach to environmental de-
cisionmaking that would result from the application of federal 
common law in the water pollution field. Lower courts have 
extended the rule to include aIr pollution207 and hazardous waste 
disposal regulation.208 If CERCLA is allowed to be used as a 
surrogate for displaced federal common law nuisance, the com-
prehensive statutory scheme for pollution control will be distorted 
by the resulting variety of court-fashioned remedies.209 Industry 
204.Id. 
205. No. 81-2083, slip op. (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 1982). 
206. EDF v. Gorsuch, No. 81-2083, slip op. at 6 (citing Ass'n of American R.Rs. v. Costle, 
562 F.2d 1310, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (emphasis in original)). 
207. New England Legal Foundation v. Costle, 475 F. Supp. 425 (D. Conn. 1979), ajl'd 
inpart,rev'd on other grounds , 632 F.2d 936(2d Cir.1980),ajj'd 666 F.2d 30(2d Cir.1981). 
208. United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981). 
209. United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
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will more likely elect to litigate questions of liability and remedy 
because an ad hoc approach may greatly increase the stakes of 
successful litigation. 
As demonstrated by the discussion of section 107 "response 
authority" and section 106 "abatement authority,"210 the EPA has 
the responsibility to take action when two events occur. It must 
identify a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance 
or pollutant which may present an imminent and substantial 
threat to public health, welfare or the environment.211 A second 
requirement is that the owner, operator, or other responsible 
party is not itself taking action to respond to that release.212 To file 
a lawsuit using section 106, the EPA must also determine that 
there is a substantial and imminent danger to public health, 
welfare, and the environment from an actual or threatened re-
lease of a hazardous substance.213 Thus, if the EPA does deter-
mine that there is the threat specified by the statute, it has a duty 
to take responsive action, following the standards and guidelines 
of the National Contingency Plan.214 However, while it may file a 
lawsuit to assist in that response, it is very clear that enforcement 
authority is not intended to relieve the EPA of its obligation to 
follow statutory and regulatory guidelines.215 
The problems inherent in the current EPA approach, which 
ignores the Plan in the formulation of remedies and circumvents 
section 107 in the determination of liability, are significant. As 
discussed above, several problems flow from the current ad hoc 
approach to determining liability. Judicial conflict and confusion 
as to the scope of liability makes it difficult for parties to deter-
mine whether they can ever be held liable. The circumvention of 
Congressional intent may unfairly impose liability on parties not 
covered by the scope of the statute. In addition, a policy which 
seeks to enforce zero-release concepts, rather than the Clean 
Water Act section 311 "harmful quantity" standard, appears to 
contradict one which seeks to maximize the benefits of expendi-
ture of the funds available for cleanup. The Agency's power of 
coercion is substantial as a result of its ability to enforce a zero-
release policy, but the beneficial results of this coercion are not 
210. See supra text and notes at notes 41-73. 
211. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(l) (Supp. v 1981). 
212. [d. 
213. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. v 1981). 
214. E.g. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(4) (Supp. v 1981). 
215. See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 9606(c) (Supp. v 1981). 
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evident. Regarding the determination of a remedy, ignoring the 
comprehensive response scheme which Congress mandated be 
adopted in the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Con-
tingency Plan may be a direct violation of CERCLA. In addition, 
it is difficult for potentially liable parties to litigate the question of 
appropriate remedy when the EPA requests only that a waste 
site be "cleaned up," without taking the investigatory action laid 
out in the Plan, or specifying what remedial action should be 
taken. 
The EPA may be moving toward greater reliance on section 107 
and the Plan in establishing liability and formulating remedies. 
To the extent that it is now performing remedial investigation 
and conducting feasibility studies before bringing a section 106 
action, the EPA may be providing a basis for applying the stan-
dards of CERCLA and its regulations. The EPA has also indi-
cated that it will now provide a "window" for settlement only at 
selected stages of the litigation,216 and that it will not settle for 
less than eighty percent of cleanup cost, as determined by its 
feasibility study.217 While it is perhaps too early to measure the 
success of this new strategy, it appears that the revised EPA 
program may be creating more questions than answers, and 
courts will still be called upon to determine not only who is liable, 
but the appropriate remedy as well. It is in everyone's interest 
that one way or another, the EPA take action to inject more 
certainty, predictability, and consistency into the difficult task of 
allocating the costs of cleaning up hazardous waste sites. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the United States will continue to seek privately 
funded cleanup, and avoid expenditure of money from the Super-
fund to the maximum extent possible. The National Oil and 
Hazardous Waste Contingency Plan provides that "voluntary" 
private cleanup resulting from legal action would serve as an 
"alternative" to any cleanup responsibility the government might 
otherwise have. Section 106(a) is the enforcement tool which is 
likely to be used, and that section apparently authorizes the 
216. 14 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 53 (May 13, 1983). 
217. 14 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 979 (Oct. 14, 1983). Earlier announcements would require a 
settlement offer equal to 100% of estimated costs. The EPA asserted that government 
cost overruns would result in an even greater cost to parties who did not settle prior to 
cleanup. 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 529 (Aug. 20, 1982). 
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government to undertake or direct abatement action in emer-
gency situations without a showing of liability under section 107 
of the Act, upon a Presidential "determination" of imminent and 
substantial endangerment. The proposed use of section 106 as an 
enforcement tool goes beyond its intended emergency application 
and would convert it into a liability provision. Furthermore, the 
government has indicated that the standards and criteria of the 
Plan apply to private cleanup, with the exception of cost balanc-
ing considerations.218 If private cleanup is an "alternative" to 
government action, it is unlikely that the criteria will be equitably 
applied. By merely drafting a complaint that combines the strict 
liability aspects of the statute, the broad language of section 
106(a), and an argument that the trier of fact should determine 
whether there "may be an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to the public health ... or the environment" under that 
section, the United States will be able to argue that the imposition 
of this heightened liability standard presents an "alternative" to 
government cleanup. 
Unless the court refuses to allow use of section 106 or other 
"judicial or administrative action" as ammunition in non-
emergency situations, any defendant in a cleanup action may 
anticipate that a CERCLA claim will be presented. An EPA 
"determination" under section 106(a) could trigger broad implied 
liability not anticipated by existing law. Therefore, whether the 
government can now use the Act, particularly whether it can use 
section 106(a), to effectuate private cleanup, presents an impor-
tant question because of the potential for long-term uncertainty 
about liability which may arise if a CERCLA count is included in 
a complaint, and because the extent of potential liability will be 
less certain if courts are asked to fashion remedies on a case by 
case basis. 
The Supreme Court in Milwaukee II rejected an ad hoc ap-
proach to water pollution contro1.219 Cases involving RCRA, 
CERCLA, federal common law nuisance, and other statutory 
claims, have followed suit. EDF v. Gorsuch220 has made it clear 
that Congress did not intend that CERCLA be enforced in an ad 
hoc manner, and that if the Agency would like to have more 
flexibility under the statute, it must look to Congress, not the 
courtS.221 
218. 47 FED. REG. 31,217 (July 16, 1982) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(j». 
219. Supra note 92. 
220. No. 81-2083, slip op. (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 1982). 
221. I d. at 6. 
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Although CERCLA was intended to fill a gap in existing envi-
ronmental statutes, it should not be interpreted so broadly that it 
renders the "comprehensive scheme" of other environmental 
statutes meaningless. Those statutes, to an extent, may have 
displaced common law nuisance. CERCLA should not be inter-
preted to reinstate aspects of nuisance law which other statutes 
have rejected, and CERCLA certainly was not intended by Con-
gress to open up whole new areas of liability beyond those ex-
pressly identified in the statute. The courts should find that liabil-
ity under CERCLA is, in fact, limited to that expressly set forth in 
the statutory language. It should avoid finding implied liabilities 
in the language of section lO6(a), beyond those intended by the 
emergency provision and supported by other substantive bodies 
of law. In addition, the EPA should exercise its full statutory 
authority to perform the necessary investigation to determine 
what remedies are necessary, and relate its findings and request 
for remedies to a potentially liable party at the initial stages of 
negotiation. By exercising this authority, Congress' statutory 
scheme will be given effect, and all parties, including the public, 
should benefit. 
